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A Critical Study
3y Sulayman S. Nyang

e encounter between Europe and Africa
rise to numerous problems for the
:JeOple of the continent. It exposed their
:::ultu res and economies to the aggres~- ely expanding forces of capitalism and
=-e attendant racist ideology which ra- alized the emerging political and
aconomic relationships between the peo:: es of the Northern Hemisphere and
~ se of the Southern Hemisphere. Also, it
.:ooned up a deep psychological and
::;sycho-cultural wound in the mental es-c:e of the African as well as other Third
rid peoples. This psychological injury,
~ n g with the political subordination that
-;;suited from the technological superior- , of the colonizing forces, combined to
:reate the Manichean world which Frantz
=-anon poetically portrayed in Black Skin ,
nite Masks.
The African's attempt to wiggle out of
- -s historical position of colonial de- dency led to a series of revolts , upris~. labor strikes and other minor inces of anomic violence . This drive to
3;Sert one's pride and dignity before the
=--ogant imperial powers put the national- leaders and the masses on a collision
rse with the watchdogs of the Euro=ean colonial territories in Africa.
rtegardless of how one may feel about
<:3 Europe-Africa encounter, the fact reins that the efforts at liberation consti- -,, what scholars and political commen- rs around the world now call the
- - -can Revolution. Of course, there are
erous meanings for the term, but for
sake of clarity, the African Revolution
...c..1 be defined as the total efforts of the
- - - an peoples to liberate themselves
the yoke of foreign rule and to make
ry in the capacity of free men who can
- - par excellence of the African Revolu. Fanon was not as prolific as Kwame
- e become the universal inheritance of
n civilization .
n ough numerous books and articles
been written on the subject, the writ~ave
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ings of Fanon have made him the intellectual par excellence of the African Revolution. Fanon was not as pro Iific as Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana or Leopold Senghor of
Senegal , but the limited number of works
he left behind have conferred upon him
the mantle of greatness which the other
two thinkers now enjoy in the Third World
The reason that Fanon became the darling
of the Third World radicals was that he
articulated effectively what most of them
felt for so long but could not find the
proper time , place or words to make them
known to other members of the coloniallycreated community of suffering. Added to
this was the fact that Fanon practicalized
his politics by joining a revolutionary force
at the height of its battle against French
rule in Algeria.
Scholarly interest in the works of Fanon
has also been motivated by the unique
characteristics of this intellectual from
Martinique. The Fanon legend has not
only attracted scholars who are trying to
understand the processes of change in the
developing countries; it also captured the
imag ination of those scholars who are interested in groups and identity formation .
Thi s second group of scholars found that
the influence of the man from Martinique
goes beyond the Black World. He has
been the mentor of Bengal is in their battle
to create Bangladesh out of Pakistan; he
is the idol of the nationalists in Ireland , the
star of the Palestinians and the ideological guru of the French Canadians who see
some similarities between their subordinate role in the Canadian federation and
that of the colonized as described by
Fanon.
As it should be evident by now, Fanon
was admired largely because of his success as a man of action. He was not an inte Ilectual engaged in the theoretical analysis of human oppression from the safety
of his academic ivory tower, but a committed and sincere activist who derived
and lived his theories of liberation from
one of the corners of the battlefield where
the Algerian revolutionary struggle raged .
Ironica lly, a good number of African
intellectuals are still undecided about

Fanon 's ideas. This fact was noted by
Paul A. Beckett when he asked in a recent
article whether " in the situation of postindependence uncertainty Fanon 's
thought will become more significant in
West Africa than heretofore." 1

21

African intellectuals, whom Fanon often
attacked in his writings , have not rallied
enthusiastically around his ideas partly
because they are not the chosen people
in the gospel of Fanonian liberation. This
special role has been assigned to the
peasantry. In Fanon 's view, the intellectual
class can only contribute to the liberation
of their colonized people, not only by cutting that umbilical cord that ties them to
their European fellows in the metropole,
but also by disassociating themselves
completely from the politics of collaboration with the imperialist powers.
Such a task has been deemed difficult
by some of the African intellectuals. As
Am ilcar Cabral once stated , these bourgeoisie must commit class suicide in the
interest of the revolution if they are to contribute to the liberation and transformation
of their society. Such a state of mind has
not been manifested in most, if not all, of
the newly independent African and Asian
countries.

I. Theory of Violence
Fanon's theory of violence has been one
key aspect of his political thought that has
generated a lot of comment. Emmanuel
Hansen, in an art icle , "Frantz Fanon: A
Bibliography Essay," listed numerous articles that addressed themselves to this
matter. 2
Thi s part of Fanon's thought cannot be
properly understood unless and until one
follows the arguments of Fanon on colonialism and its ev ils. To Fanon, co lonialism
did not only give rise to unequal relationship between the colonized and the colonizer, but it also shattered the very psychocultura l and psychohistorical foundations
of the colonized society. This is to say, according to Fanon, the life of the colonized
in a colonial society was that of a series of
historical and cultural abuses and hum iiiNEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1979
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ations whose totality constituted the phenomenon of colonial alienation.
It was Fanon 's attempt to deal psychotherapeutically with this problem of alienation that led him to the theory of violence.
Though this theory has been scrutinized,
distorted, misrepresented and lauded by
all kinds of reviewers and commentators ,
there is still room for its examination and
analysis again- just to decide whether
Fanon is relevant to Africa today.
Fanon 's thesis on violence is based on
the following premises: (1) that the colonial society is based on force (2) that the
colonized people are kept on their knees
because they are terrorized and inferiorized into submission (3) that violence is
the only language comprehensible to the
colonizers (4) that logic and reason are
inadequate tools in the fight against colonialism (5) that violence is cathartic and
self-purifying for the colonized who employ it against their colonial oppressors.
Decolonization , Fanon argues, can only
come about when the co lonized people
take to violence. He puts forth the logic
that since violence is the instrument used
by the colonizer to destroy the society of
its colonial subjects, then for the colonized
to stand on their own psychological feet,
vis-a-vis the colonizer, they must not only
slough off the yoke of inferiority and fear,
but must also seize control of the colonial
state apparatus used against them. They
must also take advantage of the psychic
dividends derived from their investment
in violence during the colonial struggle
against the enemy.
In discussing the relevance of Fanon 's
theory of violence to present day Africa , I
would like to argue that the historical record of the African states do not by any
means fulfill Fanon 's dream. Indeed , so
dissimilar were the actual processes of
decolonization from what Fanon has
painted as desirable in his book, The
Wretched of the Earth , that Professor
Aristide Zolberg could write:
The discrepancy between this statement and the actual historical record in
Africa provides a clue to the tone of the
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entire work. It is not concerned with
providing an empirical description or a
sociological explanation of political
phenomena, but with shaping reality in
accordance with "historical necessity"
before it is too late. 3
That the historical record does not
correspond with the aspirations expressed in Fanon 's writings does not necessarily destroy the validity of his thesis.
Zolberg himself recognizes this fact when
he says that for Fanon "decolonization is
not the establishment of a new state or the
achievement of sovereignty but the replacement of one species of men by another species of men." 4 It is this last
statement that explains the Fanonian position . Violence, according to Fanon , is the
tool with which the colonized people
could kill two birds with one stone.5 They
could employ it to rid themselves of the
colonialists who had imposed themselves
willy-nilly on the co lonized society; they
could also use it to purify themselves from
the virus of colonial alienation.
Actually, there is a paradox in Fanon 's
theory of violence and I tend to believe
that this paradox is the root cause of the
confusion about Fanon . The paradox, as I
see it, is that Fanon knows very well that
the violence of the colonizer served two
main purposes: first, it provided the colonizer with the opportunity to thingify the
others; second, it degraded the vanquished and his society by placing him
and his society in the position of objects
to be used , exploited and thingified.
On the other hand , Fanon finds that
when the table is turned against the colonizer, violence works miracles for the
colonized . It does not only dethrone the
self-deified man , but it also brings about
a revelation . This revelation is the knowledge that vio lence and its agents are not
the respectors of self-styled men-gods. Indeed , the mere fact that the inferiorized
man could spill the blood of members
of this community of self-deified men
means that the common denominator he
shares with these colon izers is their mutual mortality.

This understanding of Fanon sheds quate light on the psychological si
cance he attaches to violence. Fal)G('"
cog nizant of the psycho-therapeutic ture of violence and forth is reason he _
Violence alone, violence , committee_
the people, violence organized
educated by its leaders, makes it
sible for the masses to understand~
cial truths and gives the key to them..:
When this statement is related to deo..~
opments in Africa, we find that indepe-::ent African states did not resort to vio l
to win their freedom from Europe.
Algeria among the Afri can indepe
states travelled along the path of re
tionaryviolence. Yet, if one is to accep<-.=c
contention of Professor L. Adele Jina=_
one would have to agree that "there is
indication that the FLN (Algeria's re
tionary party) had a better bargai · _
position at Evian than , say, the Nigeric..
or Kenyans, or Ghanaians, (then the
Coast) in London." 7
Though Jinadu himself concedes fact that without violence Charles =>=Gau Ile might not have re-entered ::-=French political scene again, his arg ment sti ll remains convinc ing. Algeria -attained independence by following-=
course of violence, but the language
violence learned by the Algerian re
tionaries-particularly the peasan .has not wrought that miracle which F~
expected to take place. B. Marie Per. baum , in an article , "Fanon and the R
lutionary Peasantry," writes:
With few notable exceptions-mosr
which come from the autogest ·
sector-the post independence ree=tions of the peasants have been l
than revolutionary. The war-time ·__
fence so skillfully directed into rev
tionary channels has given way to -=
pressures of daily routines. War-ti
ideological indoctrination may ti -porarily have transformed peasa;into 'leaping wolves' and 'rising g
of wind', but did not inoculate
against the other side of the peas;:;;-

=
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CJa.radox, the fruitless inertia and rural
'.Jbscuratism Fanon feared. 8
This obseNation reveals the other side
of the paradox of the Fanonian theory of
violence, and indeed it is this aspect of his
ought that exposes him to very telling
lows from his critics.
The point which Fanon's critics have
-epeated over and over again is the fact
at Fanon naively assumes that violence
- the golden road to true liberation, and
-;iat once violence is properly uti Ii zed in
name of the revolution, al I of its partici::ants would continue to live up to the
:teals of the revolution even after the new
~le is established .
To Fanon, violence has a cleansing
" eel , because it "frees the native of his
-"eriority complex and from his despair
31d inaction; it makes him fearless and reres his self-respect." 9 Again , violence
~ es as a soc ial adhesive because, as
~
...non argues, such a violence "consti- -es their only work, invests their characwith positive and creative quali-as." 10 In relating this idea of Fanon to
- - ·ca, I can say that his notion of indial violence as a cleansing act has not
een concretized . Most of his commenta::; have not been impressed by it. Even
- Algerians express some reseNations.
analyzing the relevance of this aspect
-= =anon's thought to Africa , one needs to
mber that in the newly independent
- - · an states, the type of vio le nee that is
mon is far from Fanonist in quality.
ps and rebellions have been reported
ica, but no Fanonist type of violence
emerged yet. There are at present
_ ~ ilia movements in the settler states,
- all the evidence available seems to
est that in some of these groups,
- ic ity, regionalism and petty rivalry
- ~ to a certain extent eroded the fauns of national unity which Fanon asja.ted with the use of violence.
- ;nilcar Cabral , while accepting the
- ing character of the armed struggle
- st the Portuguese colonial enemy,
felt that violence by itself could do
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,_________

_ _ _ ___

-

-

the trick in situations of national rivalry.
Like the Vietnamese Nguyen Nghe,
Cabral places emphasis on political education and national development. During
an address before a group of revolutionary peasants, the late revolutionary
said:

The armed struggle is very important.
But the most important is to have an
understanding of the conditions of our
people. Our people support armed
struggle. We must give them the certainty that those who have arms in their
hands are the sons of the people and
that arms have no superiority over working tools. If one carries a rifle and the
other a tool, the most important of the
two is he who carries a tool. For one
takes up arms to defeat the Portuguese ,
but if we want to chase out the Portuguese, it is to defend those who use
toolsn
Cabral 's statement touches an important aspect of the paradox of the Fan on ian
theory of violence. After the colonized
have liberated themselves , what then are
they going to do with the techniques of
violence they have acquired over the
years? In response to this question Cabral
and Nghe would suggest that without
proper political education , nothing concrete and revolutionary would take place.
Guy Martin-Kane of Indiana University,
in an article, "Fanon on Violence and the
Revolutionary Process of Africa," has tried
to defend Fanon by suggesting that to
Fanon violence is not only for the liquidation of the enemy, but for the repossession
and acquisition of land and bread. 12
This claim is obvious to most of Fanon 's
commentators, but what is confounding is
the fact that Fanon 's theory of violence
suffers from political cretinism - meaning
Fanon did not develop and tie this idea to
a broader and more comprehens ive theory
of past colonial national development. It
is indeed this po litical retardation or oversight on the part of Fanon that led Paul
Beckett to write: "Fanon contributes

virtually nothing to a solution of the prob- 23
lem of creating and maintaining a popular
and socialist state organization." 13
Fanon thought that the armed struggle
would set the stage for the newly liberated
men to play their revolutionary role· in the
human histori cal drama. But what he failed
to realize was the fact that violence is a
drug that could either kill its user or put
him temporarily in a state of revolutionary
ecstasy, and that once its hangover effects are gone, the user is willy-nilly
forced by the concatenation of circumstances to face the reality of economic
deprivation once again.
In an African World that is divided into
states and whose leaders have deceived
or convinced themselves that they are
really independent, any appeal to violence as the royal road to liberation is
bound to face serious opposition.
Fanon writes articulately about the
African bourgeoisie that seized power
with the departure of the ex-colonialists.
He knows how corrupt and inconsiderate
they are. He also notes their arrogance.
But the appl ication of Fanon 's theory of
violence is not the issue here. The point in
dispute is the applicability and the necessity of such an approach to liberation. To
this question, Aristide Zolberg gives an
answer. The veteran American Africanist,
reflecting upon the hope of the African
revolution , writes:

Rulers will change, their rhetoric will
differ, their emissaries will travel to other
capitals . At home, however, the most
likely outcome will be "more of the
same": a regime with flimsy structures
of authority, ill-equipped to cope with
the immense task of modernization, hiding beneath a ritualistic authoritarian
facade , and devoting much of its skimpy
resources to the maintenance of an
oligarchy. Perhaps new spokesmen are
coming who will invoke Fanon as the
prophet of the second revolution. 14
Since the picture which is painted
above has already been prophesied by
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1979
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"the prophet of the Second Revolution "
and is being fulfilled in many of the Third
World countries , can we expect a band of
believers of the kingdom of Fanonian
Iiberation to launch their struggle in the
manner of all political movements that
have ever wished to change the world?
The answer to this question cannot be
given here. It wi II , however, be attempted
in the next section where Fanon's theory
of the revolutionary peasantry will be the
main focus.
The other important point is: Fanon's
theory of violence assumes that the revolutionary cadre would emerge out of the
intellectual class. The theory also entrusts
the important task of political education to
the "illegalist intellectuals" who are willing to abandon their collaborationist colleagues in the urban areas and move out
to the countryside where they would join
forces with the rural masses.
It can be said, briefly and in passing ,
the new African leaders are so latched on
to their newly acquired powers that one
wonders whether political matrimony is
the newest African innovation over the
traditional form of polygamy. This phenomenon, which I describe as "political
monogamy," is generally characterized
by the intense jealousy of African pol iticians towards their ministerial portfolios.
Each minister seems to take his newly acquired power as a bride from the political
kingdom which Nkrumah advised them to
seek.
In light of these recent developments in
African politics, I would argue that Fanon's
theory of violence would be logical for
those who share his view that decolonization is incomplete so long as the peasantry is not bui Iding the foundations of the
new society, where their interests will not
be at the mercy of a corrupt and unconcerned bourgeoisie. For those who are
more realistic about the facts of African
life and politics, the chances for a Fanonian revolutionary use of violence is farfetched, not because the idea is absurd
and impractical, but because of the un-
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availability of Fanonian missionaries who
are ready to take the doctrines of the deceased prophet to the chosen people.

II. The Revolutionary Peasantry.
The most important contribution of Fanon
to political thought in the new Africa is his
theory of a revolutionary peasantry. In his
view, this body of men constitutes the
chosen people who certainly have a rendezvous with the national destiny. This
national destiny is the state of affairs
whereby psycho-political and psychosocial balances are observable, not only
in the ideas and thought patterns of the
members of the emerging nations, but
also in the activities undertaken within
this newly established nation .
In Iight of the above statements, one
question comes to mind: Why does Fanon
sing le out the peasantry for th is important
historical role? The answer is provided in
his The Wretched of the Earth , where
Fanon argues that within the colonial society the peasantry is at the bottom of the
pecking order and is the most exploited .
On top of this externally superimposed
social/economic hierarchy, Fanon tel ls us,
is the African bourgeoisie.
Next to this smal I fraction of the African
population is the working class, followed
by the lumpen-proletariat This last social
category consists of those landless peasants who have found their way to the urban
centers of the colonizer.
Fanon implicitly compares this group to
both the African middle class of the towns
and the peasantry in the fol lowing
passage:
The landless peasants , who make up the
lumpen-proletariat, leave the country
districts , where vital statistics are just so
many insoluble problems, rush toward
the towns , crowd into the tinshack settlements , and try to make their way into
the ports and cities founded by colonial
domination. The bulk of the country people for their part continue to live within
a rigid framework, and the extra mouths
to feed ha ve no other alternative than

to emigrate toward the centers population. 15 _

In the passages following the one c··=above, Fanon idealizes the African peEEantry as the defender of traditions. In le::;.
to use his own words, "the peasantry --:::.
colonized society stands for the di plined element whose interests lie
maintaining the social structure." 16
Though Fanon is realistic enough ~
recognize the dangers of a mumified::::.
dition, his analysis suggests that -:::.
peasants could be disciplined and a - __
istic in their spontaneous movements. TI
Fanonian faith in the revolutionary pote-tials of the peasantry is part of his gen =..
belief in the role of a chosen pea =.
Though many commentators and revi
ers have attacked him on this issue, seeral of these works are either too pol1:rical or too unpersuasive to be accepted_
A close look at the train of events
Africa during the post World War II pe reveals that the African peasantry
been used for electoral purposes ra
than for violent overthrow of colonial
gimes. In Ghana, under Nkrumah,
Convention Peoples Party proved to
more successful than its rivals simply 00cause Nkrumah took his campaigns to • rural folks . It was this clever techniq ue electioneering that gave him the su ppoof both the so-cal led "Verandah boys" re=
Ghana's big towns and cities and the rurE
voters in the countryside .17
The Ghanaian record does not sh<:Ji
Nkrumah as an organizer of the Africa.peasantry for a violent overthrow of Britist
colonialism . What really took place Ghana was the attempt by young poli cians to seize power from older and more
conservative leaders. In fact, when one
talks about Ghana's evolution to ind&pendence, one can maintain that Nkrumah's positive action was more constitutional ly accommodation ist than blantantl}
violent
In the pre-independence era, Nkruma;
was more Ghandian and more accom ~
dative; in the post colonial period ,

5
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came to see the pitfalls of neo-colonialism
of which Fanon writes so eloquently.
At the second stage of his ideological
development, Nkrumah revised his previous position on a united front of all
Ghanaians in the name of national unity
and developed a class analysis of African
society. The following statement sums up
his post-1966 position :
Class divisions in modern African society became blurred to some extent
during the pre-independence period,
when it seemed there was national unity
and all classes joined forces to eject
the colonial power. This led some to
proclaim that there were no class divisions in Africa and that communalism
and egalitarianism of traditional African
society made any notion of a class
struggle out of the question . But the
exposure of this fallacy followed quickly
after independence, when class cleavages which had been temporarily submerged in the struggle to win political
freedom reappeared, often with increased intensity, particularly in those
places where the newly independent
government embarked on socialist policies.18
When compared to the Fanonian formution , this second position of Nkrumah is
- ·gnificant 011 two grounds. First, prior to
·s death, Nkrumah came to share the Fanian contention that the national bour:;;eoisie is bent on feeding parasitically on
e labors of the downtrodden of African
::oc iety. Like Fanon , he again came to the
"38.I ization that:
Unlike the bourgeoisie of developed
countries, which may be termed a business bourgeoisie, the African bourgeoisie is mainly bureaucratic and professional. It is in general not engaged in
production, nor does it control production. For its suNival it depends on producers , and their production is controlled by imperialism. 19
The second point about Nkrumah 's post
- 366 position . is that though he shares
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Fanon 's view of the national bourgeoisie,
he still persists in his Marxian belief that
the African revolution has an important
role for the proletariat. It is here that the
two African theoreticians part company.
Nkrumah's chart on page 11 of his Class
Struggle in Africa classifies the .African
peasantry as one of the partners of the
workers in their collective oppression , but
he refuses to take the bold Fanonian stand
that the African revolution is to be carried
out by the peasantry.
When one looks at other African countries one easily notices that the peasantry
has not yet lived up to the prophet's expectations. The record seems to suggest
that the national bourgeoisie for whom
Fanon reserves only bitter and harsh
words are still using this same peasantry
for their own good. In some areas, Fanon 's
warning that tribalism or regionalism
would be used to divide the peasantry
seemed to have been vindicated ; in
others, the mass parties that emerged to
forge a multiethnic foundation for the
emerging state proved to be_in the postcolonial era a neo-colonial Trojan horse
that was presented to the countryside by
the urban politicians and their rural counterparts. Such a Trojan horse is, however,
very dangerous for it is manufacturered
by international capital.
Reading through the massive collection
of articles, books and monographs, one
finds that Fanon 's understanding of the
African peasantry is more emotional than
systematic and scientific. As some Africanists have pointed out in their publications , the African peasantry varies in
membership from region to region . This
understanding is lacking in Fanon , and
when we talk about the historical record
on African politics, it becomes very clear
to most of us that the Fanon ian hope of
spontaneous peasant revolution is more
normatively prescriptive than historical.
The turn of events in Africa since 1961
definitely proved Fanon all wrong , and
there are certainly reasons for such a
rapid evaporation of the Fanonian hope.

The national bourgeoisie did not share
the Fanonian vision of the peasantry. To
the bourgeois leaders, the peasantry has
been a tool to forge electoral victories
rather than an instrument to dismantle the
colonial apparatus in the name of national
development.

25

In a world dominated by men who are
armed with science and technology,
Fanon fails to see that the peasants can
only be led to action after a long period of
political education. He did read the handwriting on the colonial wall , and missed
the fact that the peasants were already
sold to the neocolonial regime. This point
is crucial. Since the independence of
Ghana, not a single African state has attained freedom without a leadership that
is part of the collaborative bourgeoisie.
Even the Algeria for which Fanon did so
much has not escaped this phenomenon
completely.
The African revolution , under peasant
leadership, will come about only when
peasants have developed a higher degree
of consciousness of their individual as
well as collective deprivation and exploitation. This, however, is not likely to happen without help from the outside. Fanon
himself is very much aware of this fact. In
fact, he recommends the political instruction of the peasantry by what he calls the
"i llegalist militants" from the urban centers . This group of political mentors must
be men of ideas, commitment and zea l.
They are of course the intellectuals whom
Fanon has ceaselessly pleaded for help
in the painful transformation of colonial
society.
In analyzing the prospects of a Fanonian
revolution , therefore, let us outline the
major factors that are likely to promote or
inhibit the Fanonian cause. First of all , in
addition to a heightened sense of peasant
consciousness, there must develop a
body of illegalist intellectuals who are
ready to organize the peasants for the
"new beginning" which decolonization
was expected to initiate. Such a body
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1979
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could be effective only if its members are
dedicated guerrilla missionaries who
share the Fanonian vision . Without such
fanatical enthusiasm and faith , these men
may "use Fanon 's arguments as temporary
accouterments in their effort to break into
the developing establishments." 20
The record of the last decade has shown
that many African students from European
and American universities have toned
down their mil itancy and joined the ranks
of the ruling caste which , in Fanon 's view,
is "preoccupied with filling its pockets as
rapidly as possible. " 21 Such an opportunistic turnabout is sacrilegious in the
Fanonian gospel , and no sober observer
of the African scene should discount its
frequency among aspiring young Africans.22
Another point that is worthy of attention
is the fact that a Fanonian type revolution
cannot be accomplished easily in the post
colonial era. The reason for this is quite
simp le: the new caste that Fanon attacks
so severely does not only come from the
same African background as the " illegalist intellectuals" who are supposed to
challenge them , but they also know more
than their departed colonial mentors about
the very weaknesses of their people. This
knowledge is often used in a very destructive and opportunistic manner, and the
i Ilegal ist who wishes to organize the peasantry against such an African bourgeois
caste must recogn ize these limitations.
Another point which is crucial to any
discussion on the possible role of the
peasantry in a Fanonian revolution in
Africa is the fact that Fanonian guerri Ila
missionaries would have to revise some
of their positions on the role of the proletariat and national bourgeoisie. It is true
that their prophet debunks the possible
role of the proletariat in a revolutionary
armed struggle; but at the same time , it
must be noted that the peasantry would
be able to confront the challenges and
hazards of a technological and scientific
world only with the help of all those social
groups whose members are possessors
of industrial skills and techniques.
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Fanon 's claim that the proletariat is a
privileged member of the colonial system
is a half-truth in the sense that. on one
hand , this African proletariat receives a
greater slice of the colonial cake than the
peasantry, but on the other hand, suffers
the same psychic injury of which Fanon
himself writes.
Fanon admonishes the peasant revolutionaries and lumpen-proletariat counterparts to stand on their own feet economically, politically and ideologically. He
warns them not to be without an ideology
as other African states have been since
independence.
Fan on does not only recommend to his
followers a political organization that
bridges the gulf between town and country, but he also calls for a redistribution of
wealth between the town and the country.
He goes further by telling his followers not
to beg abroad for foreign aid , but to press
for reparations. This Fanonian teaching
has been dismissed as a moral threat
without any force behind it. But, in all fairness to Fanon , such a simplistic dismissal
of the Fanonian plea does a gross injustice. Fanon 's plea is made in the light of
recent world history. Germany's atrocities
against the Jews of Europe was, as Aime
Cesaire points out elsewhere, the application of perfected European colonial
techniques on a European minority. If the
Jewish victims of Hitler were paid indemnities and reparations, why not the poor
wretched of the earth who only need technology and capital to regain their dignity
as free men and to make use of science
and technology in their own countries?

Ill. Conclusion
In the preceding paragraphs I have tried
to c larify the issues concerning the relevance of Fanonian teaching to the postindependent era in Africa. I have shown
that Fanon 's conception of violence is
paradoxical and that those who wish to
follow his gospel must be prepared to
deal with the consequences of his call for
violence. In concluding this analysis, I
would argue that the available evidence

at present does not suggest any no<=..,.
attempt to use violent means for
pose of forming a new nation in the =?onian tradition.
The kind of violence that seems - pervasive in African societies today i
which flows from the barrels of g
African army officers, settlers, and - -can guerrillas. The former's bullets~ - - rected against rival army officers anc
rupt or ineffective politicians; the 1 ~
are aimed at colonial settlers who
to recognize the simple democrat ic~ ciple of majority rule.
Fanon 's emphasis on the peasan· .
both realistic and naive simultan
It is realistic in the sense that for Afri
to regain their humanity they must s
time , money and intellectual energy
the political education and economic __
liftment of their rural people. If the
man remains in his "cave" or "med· ==world ," such a state of affairs could
become an affront to the African peasar.;;Fanon is correct in saying Africans CG""not take their rightful place in the h
drama ifthe overwhelming majority of
people are languishing in the chains peasant poverty, ignorance and hungzr
However, he was naive in believing
the African bourgeoisie would aban
its position of privilege in the name national interest. To expect an underdeveoped bourgeoisie to forfeit its privileg=
voluntarily is to exaggerate the goodnes.:::
of an advantaged human creature.
But Fanon 's naivete was not very seve
for though he calls upon the African b
geoisie to use their acquired intellectuE
and technical skills and resources for ttlG
betterment of their less fortunate brothe
he recognizes their greed and fran ·
frenzy to maximize their easy gains at the
expense of their rustic and illitera
brethren.
Related to the above is the point tha;:
Fanonian revolutionaries in the future mu
be able to differentiate between those
profiteers who ride on political and bureaucratic horses and those who try to
maximize profits by being middlemen for
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ernational capital. Such a differentiation
·11 be necessary if the Fanonian revolu- aries are to deal effectively with these
- emies against whom their master has
warned them.
The last point of importance is: Though
=anon's dreams have yet to be fulfilled in
ir totality, many of his prophecies have
:nne to pass. He has warned about one::arty states and the evidence of the last
.:ecade seems to vindicate him. He has
onished the African people about the
sibility of military coups, and today
presence of 18 military governments
the continent proves him correct. He
as said watch out against political leadwho talked about independence and
tice during the colonial period and
descred it themse lves by their blatant
:oocrisy.
e historical record certainly bears
imony to the accuracy of his words and
- - now clear that the fathers of African
·ons are shamelessly millionaires when
- lions of their fellow countrymen are
~ ely making a living.
r=anon has also taught the lesson that
e of us would worship the idols of
:.:Jali sm and regionalism, and the set of
on African political developments
to prove him correct as a prophet of
African revolution.
ese prophetic remarks of Fanon put
in a special place in African intellec-:z. history and for this reason I think his
·ngs will continue to capture the attenof reviewers, commentators and
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